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The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments:
Constitutional Authority for Federal Legislation
Against Private Sex Discrimination
Emily Calhoun*
I. INTRODUCTION
Reviewing federal legislative remedies against private discrimination, one is immediately struck by the disparity between
remedies Congress has afforded victims of race discrimination
and those afforded victims of sex discrimination. For example,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 permits covered employers to exclude women as a class from any job if sex constitutes
a "bona fide occupational qualification.1 2 Title VII, which does
not permit the exclusion of a member of a racial minority, as
such, for any reason, represents a legislative decision not to give
women the same protection with respect to employment that it
extends to members of racial minorities. Another example of
a lack of legislative fervor is apparent if one compares the provisions of 20 U.S.C. section 1681, proscribing sex discrimination in
educational institutions that receive federal financial assistance, 3
with those of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibiting race
discrimination in the same context. 4 Although the language of
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of
Law.

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-15 (Supp. V 1975).
2. Title VII's broad statement that it is unlawful to "fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate ...
because of such individual's race, color, sex or national origin," id.
§ 2000e-2 (a) (1), is undercut for women by a subsequent statutory provision that it is not unlawful to classify on the basis of sex if sex "is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise .... ." Id. § 2000e2(e). The bona fide occupational qualification has been very narrowly
defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 et seq. (1976), so that in practice women may be almost as fully protected as racial groups. But cf. General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976) (pregnancy may, contrary to EEOC guidelines, be excluded from otherwise comprehensive employee disability
programs).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V 1975). See also id.§§ 1701-1721.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Supp. V 1975).
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section 1681(a) is almost identical to that of Title VI,5 Congress
qualified the basic prohibition of sex discrimination by exempting
from coverage: 1) educational institutions whose primary purpose is training individuals for military service or for the merchant marine; 6 2) any public institution of undergraduate higher
education that traditionally and continually from its establish7
ment has had a policy of admitting students of only one sex;
and 3) certain social organizations affiliated with educational institutions." These exemptions are not included in Title VI.9 Congress has, of course, in a few instances provided protection to
victims of private sex discrimination which is equivalent to
that extended to victims of race discrimination. 10 In general,
however, one may accurately state that twentieth century federal
legislation does not prohibit private discrimination based on sex
as rigorously as it does that based on race.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Supp. V 1975) provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
The word "sex" is substituted for "race, color, or national origin," in 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1970), but the coverage of the section is limited to "education" programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (4) (Supp. V 1975).
7. Id. § 1681(a) (5).
8. Id. § 1681 (a) (6).
9. See also the implementing regulations for 20 U.S.C. § 1681,
45 C.F.R. § 86 (1975). In 20 U.S.C. § 1681 Congress may even have given
approval to sex discrimination by public entities, see text accompanying
notes 6-8 supra, which is forbidden by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution, an interesting possibility that will not be explored here.
Title VI and Title IX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c - 2000c-9 (Supp. V 1975),
have also been interpreted differently by the courts. Although in Lau

v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the Supreme Court allowed plaintiffs
claiming race discrimination to sue under Title VI, the Seventh Circuit
refused to permit a plaintiff to bring a Title IX suit alleging that the
admission standards of a private medical school receiving federal funds
discriminated against women. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 45
U.S.L.W. 2149 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 1976). The court distinguished Lau on

the ground that it, unlike the case at bar, involved large numbers of
plaintiffs trying to enforce a national constitutional right.

Id.

But see

Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 45 U.S.L.W. 2310 (N.D. Ohio Dec.
2, 1976)

(holding that Title IX creates a private cause of action).

10. For example, by a 1974 amendment, Congress made the Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (Supp. V 1975), applicable to sex
discrimination. Congress has also enacted an Equal Credit Opportunity
Act forbidding both race and sex discrimination in credit transactions.
15 U.S.C. § 1691 (Supp. V 1975).
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Although significant, the disparaties in recent legislation are
secondary to the disparity in legislative protection afforded to
women and blacks by the recently resurrected nineteenth century civil rights statutes, codified in 42 U.S.C. sections 1981,11
1982,12 and 1985 (3).13 Unlike the more recent federal legislation
which is based on Congress's article I, section 8 powers, these
statutes are viewed as congressional implementations of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. 14 While it is established
that these statutes prohibit private race discrimination, it has not
been fully resolved whether their protection will be generally
extended to women.
A review of the judicial resurrection of the nineteenth century statutes is in order. In 1968, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
13. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) reads, in relevant part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person
or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose
of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any
State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within
such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws ...

the

party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery
of damages ....
14. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e 20OO0e-15 (Supp. V 1975), for example, is said to be based on congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8,
cl. 3; although the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Act of March 24, 1972,
P.L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e - 2000e-15 (Supp. V 1975)), are based on the fourteenth amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 425 U.S. 902 (1976). Similarly, Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. V 1975), is
said to be based on the power of Congress to levy and collect taxes, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. On the other hand, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982
are derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was promulgated
after the ratification of the thirteenth amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
is derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which was passed after
ratification of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has recently held that all three provisions are valid exercises of congressional
authority to enforce the thirteenth amendment. See text accompanying
notes 15-28 infra.
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Co., 15 the Supreme Court applied a long-neglected section of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 to prohibit race discrimination in the
sale of property by private individuals, thereby giving racial minorities a new remedy against private discrimination. The plaintiff in Jones sued under 42 U.S.C. section 1982, which guarantees
all citizens of the United States the same right to sell and purchase real property "as is enjoyed by white citizens."' 6 The Supreme Court subsequently expansively defined the concept of
property in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 1 7 and Tillman
v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association,'8 and justified congressional promulgation of section 1982 by reference to section
2 of the thirteenth amendment, which states that Congress may
enact appropriate legislation for securing the amendment's prohibition of slavery and involuntary servitude. 19
In 1971 the scope of another nineteenth-century statute was
similarly expanded in Griffin v. Breckenridge.20 The Supreme
Court there overruled a twenty-year-old decision 2' that narrowly
construed the language of 42 U.S.C. section 1985 (3) to reach only
conspiracies under color of state law. Holding that section 2 of
the thirteenth amendment gave Congress authority to prohibit
private conspiracies to discriminate on the basis of race, the Court
permitted black residents of Mississippi to pursue a damage claim
against private individuals who allegedly had conspired to de22
prive the plaintiffs of equal rights and privileges.
15. 392 U.S.409 (1968).
16. See note 12 supra for the text of section 1982.
17. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In Sullivan, the board of directors of a
private swimming pool corporation refused to approve the assignment
of membership rights in the corporation from a white member who had
leased his home to a black tenant. The Supreme Court characterized the
interest conveyed to the tenant as a "leasehold of realty coupled with
a membership share" in the corporation and held that this type of property interest was covered by section 1982. Id. at 236.
18. 410 U.S. 431 (1973). Tillman, like Sullivan, dealt with membership rights in a private, residential swimming pool corporation, but the
rights could not be directly leased or transferred incident to the acquisition of property. Rather, the home buyer was given preferences-for example, priority on membership waiting lists-when he purchased a home
in a certain geographical area. The Supreme Court held that these preferences were a "bundle of rights for which an individual pays" when
buying a home, and that section 1982 operated to guarantee the rights
equally to whites and nonwhites. Id. at 437.
19. 396 U.S. at 235; 410 U.S. at 439 n.11. See generally text accompanying notes 142-95 infra.
20. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
21. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
22. 403 U.S. at 104-06.
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Finally, in 1976, in Runyon v. McCrary,23 the Supreme Court,
following the same course it had charted for section 1982 in Jones,
held that 42 U.S.C. section 1981, which gives all persons within
the United States the same right to enforce and make contracts
"as is enjoyed by white citizens," provides a remedy to black persons excluded from private schools solely because of their race.
The Runyon opinion had been foreshadowed not only by Jones
but also by the Court's decisions in Tillman24 and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency. 25 The former decision implied that section
1981 was to be construed as broadly as section 1982 against private racial discrimination, 2 6 and the latter held that "[section]
1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private
employment on the basis of race.''27 Runyon identified the thirteenth amendment as the constitutional authority for section
1981.28

Judicial resurrection of sections 1981, 1982, and 1985(3) is
significant for victims of private race discrimination because
these statutes proscribe conduct and afford remedies that are not
encompassed by more recent civil rights legislation. 29 For example, section 1981 prohibits private employment discrimination
against blacks30 and appears to apply to businesses employing
fewer than 15 people even though Title VII does not.31 While
23. 96S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
24. See note 18 supra.
25. 421U.S. 454 (1975).
26. In Tillman, the Court simply held, without elaboration, that the
private swimming pool corporation was governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
410 U.S. at 439-40. See note 18 supra.
27. 421 U.S. at 459-60.
28. 96 S.Ct. at 2598.
29. Questions of the relationship between the older and newer civil
rights legislation remain unresolved. See, e.g., Tillman v. WheatonHaven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1972). For a comparison of
42 U.S.C. § 1982 and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (Supp.
V 1975), see Smedley, A Comparative Analysis of Title VIII and Section
1982, 22 VAND. L. REv. 459 (1969). In Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S.Ct. 2586,
2595 n.10 (1976), the Supreme Court avoided deciding whether 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (e), exempting private clubs from the public accomodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and from the Fair Housing Act, required their exclusion from 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1981. See also Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976), in which the Court intimated that
a section 1981 employment discrimination claim relating to a discriminatory job test was governed by standards "similar to those obtaining under Title VII." Id. at 2052.
30. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S.Ct. 2574 (1976);
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
31. "The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (Supp. V 1975). See note 29 supra.
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no recent civil rights legislation requires private segregated
schools to admit blacks, section 1981 has been so construed in
Runyon.32 The Fair Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination
in private real estate transactions, contains exemptions for singlefamily dwellings, 33 although section 1982 does not.84 Moreover,
injunctive relief and punitive damages, remedies that are often
limited under the more recent federal legislation, are available
under sections 1981 and 1982, 35 and statutes of limitations that
generally govern sections 1981 and 1982 are significantly longer
than the statutory filing deadlines of the twentieth century civil
rights laws. 6 In addition, judicial redress for private discrimination in employment may be sought under sections 1981, 1982, and
1985(3) without first exhausting the often cumbersome adminis37
trative machinery of the more recent legislation.
Although the nineteenth century legislation is a significant
supplement to twentieth century remedies for private race discrimination, it has been judicially construed to give no comnpar32. 96 S.Ct. 2586 (1976).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1) (Supp. V 1975).

34. See Note, PioneeringApproaches to Confront Sex Bias in Housing, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 79, 97 n.103 (1975).
35. Recent civil rights acts often do not permit the award of punitive damages. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 367
F. Supp. 860, 864 (D. Md. 1973) (the fact that Title II may exclude punitive or other damages as a remedy does not mean that such damages
are not recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 517
F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975). See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (a back pay award under section 1981 is not
restricted to the two years specified for back pay recovery under Title
VII; punitive damages are available under section 1981).
Although the more recent federal legislation used to be more advantageous to plaintiffs in that it allowed the court to award attorney's fees
while the nineteenth century civil rights legislation did not, this advantage no longer exists. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. Nmvs No. 13 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988), which became effective on October 19, 1976, gives courts the authority to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing party in suits brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986.
36. The applicable statute of limitations for section 1981 or section
1982 is drawn from state law and is usually one year. See Runyon v.
McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2598-99 (1976); Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975). Compare this to the 180-day filing
deadline under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (e) (Supp. V 1975). See also
Sorenson v. Raymond, -532 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1976) (tenant, evicted for
entertaining black guest, sued landlord under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and
3604; latter count dismissed for being brought too late, but suit under
former allowed to proceed).
37. See Johnson v'. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460-61
(1975).
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able protection to victims of private sex discrimination. With
almost no exceptions, lower federal courts have refused to extend
42 U.S.C. section 1981 to reach private sex discrimination. 38 As
a matter of statutory construction, these courts have read the
language of section 1981 as an expression of congressional intent
to prohibit only discrimination of a racial character. Presumably, the courts would comparably construe the similar language
of section 1982. 39
38. See, e.g., Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 389 F. Supp. 856 (E.D.
Mo.), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Rackin v. University of Pa.,
386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F. Supp.
1042 (E.D. Mich. 1974), appeal dismissed, 519 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1975);
Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 375 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd,
411 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975); Held v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 373 F. Supp.
996 (S.D. Tex. 1974); League of Academic Women v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Fitzgerald v. United
Methodist Community Center, 335 F. Supp. 965 (D. Neb. 1972). All these

cases involved employment discrimination suits brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1981. But see Parmer v. National Cash Register Co., 346 F.
Supp. 1043 (S.D. Ohio 1972) (court gives no explanation for holding that
women may sue for sex discrimination under section 1981). See also
Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2592 (1976) ("[These cases] do not
present the question of the right of a private school to limit its student
body to boys [or] girls . . . since 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is in no way addressed
to such categories of selectivity.").
39. Both sections 1981 and 1982 guarantee all persons the same
rights "as [are] enjoyed by white citizens." See notes 11-12 supra. Although no courts have considered the applicability of section 1982 to sex

discrimination, courts have assumed that the language in section 1981 referring to rights enjoyed by white citizens emphasizes the racial character of the rights being protected. See, e.g., League of Academic Women
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 343 F. Supp. 636, 638-39 (N.D. Cal. 1972)

(citing the Supreme Court's discussion of a portion of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966)); cases cited
in note 38 supra. Courts have, however, read this language broadly
enough to extend the protection of these statutes to whites, Williamson
v. Hampton Mgmt. Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (section 1982);

Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1969) (section 1982), and
to aliens, Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.
Tex. 1972), aff'd, 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974) (section 1981). See note
170 infra. Were section 1982 construed to apply to sex discrimination,
women might be able to successfully attack discriminatory insurance

rates and coverage, since life insurance may be considered property under section 1982, Sims v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972). Similarly, since the courts have
found that even the sale of an admission ticket is a contract for purposes
of section 1981, Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 142 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 929 (1970), and life insurance is certainly a contract, challenges to

discriminatory insurance policies could also be brought under section
1981. Such challenges have been futile under other legal theories. See,
e.g., Broderick v. Associated Hosp. Serv. of Phila., 44 U.S.L.W. 2546 (3d
Cir. May 6, 1976), in which a suit attacking discriminatory hospitalization
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Judicial refusal to apply section 1985(3) to private sex discrimination is less consistent than the refusal to extend the protections of sections 1981 and 1982 to women. 40 Section 1985(3)
contains no language that would invite an interpretation restricting its applicability to race discrimination. 4 1 It simply prohibits
conspiracies to deprive any person of "the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.
*.42 The Supreme Court has construed that language to
prohibit any private conspiracy motivated by "some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."' 4 3

Sex discrimination is clearly class-based,4 4 and the Su-

insurance policies brought under section 1983, one nineteenth century
statute that affords a cause of action to women for fourteenth amendment violations, was dismissed for lack of the requisite state action.
40. For cases which have permitted sex discrimination suits against
private individuals to proceed under section 1985(3), see Reichardt v.
Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Pendrell v. Chatham College,
386 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life
Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
For cases which have raised the question but left it undecided, see
Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976) (dissenting opinion; majority dismissed complaint on ground that no conspiracy existed); Rackin v. University of
Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (since court found state action existed, no reason to reach the issue). The only court of appeals to directly
decide the issue has refused to extend section 1985 (3) to a private sex
discrimination claim. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976) (affirmed the dismissal
of a female faculty member's suit alleging that the private university discriminated against women in promotion and salaries, holding that section
1985(3) did not extend to all tortious conspiratorial interferences with
the rights of others). See also DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F.
Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
41. Section 1985 (3) is free both of the "white citizen" language of
sections 1981 and 1982 and the restrictive legislative history which limit
the scope of those sections and invite more restrictive judicial interpretations. See Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the
Thirteenth Amendment (pt. 6), 12 HousToK L. Rsv. 844 (1975).
42. See note 13 supra for the text of section 1985 (3).
43. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). This statement
by Justice Stewart for the majority may have implications for questions both of constitutional authority and statutory construction. See
Buchanan (pt. 6), supra note 41, at 866. Although the opinion specifically left open the question of whether an invidiously discriminatory intent other than racial bias would be actionable under section 1985(3),
403 U.S. at 102 n.9, -the dictum can be construed to mean not only that
section 1985 (3) may encompass all "class-based" discrimination, but also
that Congress "perhaps" has constitutional authority to prohibit private
class discrimination other than that based on race. To read Justice Stewart's equivocal "perhaps" as applying only to the issue of statutory construction would require acceptance of the proposition that Stewart
thought the language of section 1985 (3) might be limited to private race
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preme Court's inclusion of state-supported sex discrimination
within the activities proscribed by the race-neutral language of
42 U.S.C. section 198345 suggests that it would not disapprove
similarly construing section 1985 (3) to encompass sex discrimination.
A court's refusal to construe section 1985(3) to encompass
private sex discrimination claims may rest on complex assumptions about the scope of congressional power under -the fourteenth and thirteenth amendments rather than on the scope of
the statutory language. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
the only appellate court to decide the issue, stated that a section
1985(3) sex discrimination claim, bottomed on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
required a showing of state action: Congress could not reach
purely private conduct under that amendment.46 The court also
discrimination. That interpretation of the statute, however, would be at
odds with the broad construction usually given civil rights statutes. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. at 97 (citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 801 (1966)); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968).
Moreover, the language of section 1985(3), unlike that of sections 1981
and 1982, makes no reference to race. Section 1983, containing similarly
broad language, has been construed to apply to both race and sex discrimination. See note 45 infra. If Justice Stewart's statement does imply that there is constitutional authority to prohibit private discrimination based on a factor other than race, however, he gives no indication
of the source of that authority. Buchanan suggests that the dictum could
be construed as conceding to Congress the power to protect nonracial
classes under the thirteenth amendment. Buchanan, supra note 41, at
866.
44. See Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supp. 341, 347 (W.D. Pa. 1974);
Stem v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433, 442-43
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (courts held that sex discrimination is class-based within
the meaning of section 1985(3)); cf. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d
397, 408-09 n.16 (2d Cir. 1975) (court did not resolve issue of "whether
sex discrimination is the kind of 'class-based invidiously discriminatory
animus' necessary for a § 1985 (3) conspiracy," but nevertheless permitted plaintiff to maintain suit under section 1985(3)). See also Buchanan (pt. 8), supranote 41, at 1072-84.
45. The Supreme Court has not specifically stated that individuals
may use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge state-sponsored sex discrimination,
but it has reached the merits of sex discrimination claims based on this
statute. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Craig
v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
46. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 829 (7th Cir.
(1975), cert. denied, 425 US. 943 (1976). The court had held in an
earlier case, Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 19 (7th Cir. 1972), that the
fourteenth amendment provided a right to protection only against unequal treatment by a state, and it reiterated this holding in Cohen, 524
F.2d at 828. See note 98 infra. The court again adopted this position in
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assumed that the cause of action could not be based on the thirteenth amendment, which admittedly reaches private conduct,
because the plaintiff was not discriminated against on a racial
basis. 47 The combined effect of these two assumptions is to concede to Congress less power to protect women from sex discrimination than it has to protect racial groups from race discrimination.48 Other courts that have faced the issue in section 1985(3)
cases have generally failed to fully discuss these constitutional
questions.4 9
The validity of any judicial assumption that Congress is constitutionally restricted in legislating against private sex discrimination is of great significance to women. In the first place, if
the assumption is erroneous, it is possible to argue persuasively
that federal courts should give women, as well as blacks, the exMurphy v. Mt. Carmel High School, 45 U.S.L.W. 2232 (7th Cir. Oct. 4,
1976).
47. The court stated:
We have no doubt that discrimination which is invidious because
of racial motivation would be covered since the protection of the
Thirteenth Amendment is not merely against state action. But
since the Court in Griffin so carefully refrained from holding
that any discrimination which would be actionable if practiced
by the State is for that reason also actionable under § 1985(3),
we remain convinced that our reasoning in Dombrowski is a correct explanation of why the statute does not broadly "apply to
all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others."
524 F.2d at 829 (citation omitted).
48. It should be noted that in his denial of the plaintiff's petition
for rehearing in Cohen, Judge Stevens wrote that "our opinion assumed
for the purpose of decision the Congress has ample power to enact a statute having the coverage urged by petitioner but concluded that § 1985 (3)
is not such a statute." 524 F.2d at 830. This cursory statement does not
affect the fundamental assumptions underlying the holding of the case;
Stevens was simply assuming the answer to a very broad constitutional
question in order to reach the particular issue before the court.
49. In Pendrell v. Chatham College, 386 F. Supp. 341, 348 (W.D. Pa.
1974), the court discussed limitations on congressional authority under
the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, but permitted the plaintiff to
maintain her action under section 1985 (3) for the indecipherable reason
that "the Thirteenth Amendment's restrictiveness is overborne by the allinclusive effect of the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
In Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1975), the
court disputed the fact that Congress cannot reach purely private conduct
under the fourteenth amendment, and therefore permitted the plaintiff to
bring her suit.
The court in Stearns v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365
F. Supp. 433, 442-43 (E.D. Pa. 1973), permitted the 1985(3) claim, but
touched upon the constitutional issues only in discussing whether sex discrimination is "class-based" within the meaning of Griffin v. Breckenridge.
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tensive protection of nineteenth century federal civil rights legislation. At the very least, section 1985 (3) should apply to women,
for unlike sections 1981 and 1982, its language is race-neutral. 50
In addition, if Congress is acknowledged to have extensive legislative authority under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, any judicial doubts concerning the constitutionality of applying recent federal legislation, such as the Fair Housing Act, to
private sex discrimination should be eliminated. 51 Depriving Congress and the federal courts of any constitutional justification
for perpetuating disparities in the legislative protection given
women and blacks is crucial, since any real or imagined constitutional limitations on federal legislation against private sex discrimination give an historically insensitive judiciary and legisla52
ture a ready excuse for restraint.
This Article will demonstrate that recent Supreme Court decisions on Congress's power to prohibit private discrimination
under the enforcement provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments justify the conclusion that Congress has
50. See notes 13 & 41 supra.
51. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (Supp. V 1975),
is consistently read as thirteenth amendment legislation, but the cases
in which the issue has been raised have involved race discrimination.
See, e.g., Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Bob Lawrence Realty Co., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 826 (1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1973); United States v. L. & H. Land Corp.,
407 F. Supp. 576 (S.D. Fla. 1976); United States v. Hughes Memorial
Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975); United States v. Real Estate
Develop. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972). It has been suggested
that the lack of a firm base of thirteenth amendment authority was the
reason Congress left obscure the constitutional basis of the Fair Housing
Act's proscription on sex discrimination. See Buchanan (pt. 5), supra
note 41, at 627.
52. Of course one can always speculate that the reason for the
failure to provide women the same protection against private discrimination as is given to racial minorities is that congressional and judicial
attitudes toward sex discrimination reflect societal attitudes toward
women and are characterized.by the same lack of male empathy. See
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675 (1971). Pursuit of this argument is
not particularly productive, since the proposition is self-evident to some
but outrageous to others, and its proof or disproof is impossible. What
is important is the extent to which any member of Congress or a judge
can rely on a constitutional argument to justify legislative disparities in
the protection given to women, for the availability of such an argument
may prevent honest confrontation of whatever sexist attitudes may exist.
For this reason, this Article focuses on the validity of the legal assumption that Congress is constitutionally restricted in taking action against
private sex discrimination rather than on sexist attitudes themselves.
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greater authority to legislate against private sex discrimination
than has so far been fully recognized. The focus is on the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments for a number of reasons.
First, these amendments are the constitutional provisions most
directly applicable, by language and intent, to discriminatory
conduct. The only prerequisite to congressional action to enforce
the thirteenth amendment is the determination that a badge or
3
incident of slavery, as rationally defined by Congress, exists .
Enforcement of the fourteenth amendment is partially restricted
by the state action language of section 1, 5 4 but it, like the thirteenth, is specifically directed at discrimination. Second, because
of the similarity in wording of the fourteenth amendment and
the proposed equal rights amendment, conclusions about the
scope of the enforcement clause of the former bear directly on
congressional power to proscribe private sex discrimination under
the latter, should it be ratified. 55 Finally, there is no other
53. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (thirteenth
amendment); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968)
(thirteenth amendment). For a discussion of the potentially broad reach
of this power, see text accompanying notes 142-95 infra.
54. See text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
55.

The language of the proposed equal rights amendment parallels

that of the fourteenth amendment and will, therefore, add little to congressional authority to prohibit private sex discrimination beyond that
which already exists under the fourteenth amendment. The amendment
states that "equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States -or by any State on account of sex" and
gives Congress "the power to enforce by appropriate legislation," its substantive provisions. Until the 1971 legislative session, the proposed enforcement clause stated only that "Congress and the several States shall
have power, within their respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation," thereby limiting Congress's power to that secured by some other portion of the Constitution. See S. REP. No. 267,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1 (1943).
Although legislative debate on the current form of the amendment
virtually ignored the enforcement clause, that the language was altered
to conform to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment means they will
be comparably construed. Congressional authority to legislate against
private sex discrimination under the equal rights amendment, however,
could not be undercut by the judicial development of a double standard,
as it has under the fourteenth amendment. See text accompanying notes
117-40 infra. Ratification of the equal rights amendment would, therefore, foreclose any argument that Congress has less extensive powers to
proscribe private sex discrimination than to prohibit private race discrimination under the fourteenth amendment. For a discussion of
changes in congressional authority that might be occasioned by ratification of the equal rights amendment, see text following note 140 infra.
Much has been written on the equal rights amendment. For interesting discussions of the need for the amendment and its impact on existing laws, see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights
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325

source of congressional authority as extensive as that contained
in the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. To be sure, Congress may act pursuant to its authority to promulgate legislation
"necessary and proper" to further its general powers enumerated
in article I of the Constitution,5 6 but that source of authority
is limited.

57

Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80
YALE L.J. 871 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as The Equal Rights Amendment]; Elsen, Coogan & Ginsburg, Men, Women and the Constitution:
The Equal Rights Amendment, 10 COLum. J. L. Soc. PROB. 77 (1973).
56. See note 14 supra.
57. It can be argued that Congress has sufficient power under the
commerce clause to make superfluous thirteenth and fourteenth amendment sources of congressional authority to prohibit private sex discrimination. For example, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a - 2000a-6 (Supp. V 1975), which prohibits private racial discrimination in public accommodations, was adopted partially pursuant to the
commerce clause power. See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce on S.1732, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., parts 1 & 2 (1963). In Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the Supreme Court upheld Title
II as a valid exercise of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. The Court held that Title II extended to restaurants which
simply sold food that had moved in interstate commerce, indicating a
clear willingness to uphold federal legislation primarily geared to the
accomplishment of a noneconomic objective, such as the elimination of
private racial discrimination, so long as it has some tenuous connection
with commerce. In fact, in McClung, the Court sanctioned legislation
affecting a private activity which alone has no significant effect on commerce but which, as a nationwide practice, could have such an impact.
379 U.S. at 300-01. Recent Supreme Court decisions reiterate that the
Court will defer to congressional findings that private activity has an
impact on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, 96
S. Ct. 498 (1976); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
The Supreme Court's deference to the congressional exercise of commerce clause authority gives Congress much leeway to prohibit private sex discrimination. That leeway is not unlimited, however. No
Supreme Court decision has completely dispensed with the requirement that there be some connection between interstate commerce and the
private activity that is the subject of commerce clause legislation. It
would be extremely difficult, for example, to justify 42 U.S.C. § 1981
as a valid exercise of commerce clause authority, since the statute simply
prohibits private racial discrimination in the making of all types of contracts. Not all types of contracts can be construed as related to interstate
commerce. The thirteenth amendment, on the other hand, clearly authorizes legislation of this breadth, although congressional authority may
be limited by the need to demonstrate that a failure to contract imposes
a badge or incident of slavery, see text accompanying notes 157-67 infra.
If Congress were to enact a statute comparable to section 1981 for the
benefit of women it would probably have to seek some source of constitutional authority other than its commerce clause powers. For a general
discussion of congressional authority under the commerce clause, see P.
BENSON, JR., Tim SUPREMEn

(1970).

COURT AND Tim COMMERc E

CLAUSE,

1937-1970
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The interpretation of the fourteenth and thirteenth amendments is therefore centrally important to ascertaining both the
broadest scope of, and possible constitutional limitations on, congressional action against private sex discrimination. Any assumption that Congress has more limited authority to legislate
against private. sex discrimination than against discrimination
based on race is not justified, especially in light of the implications of a recent Supreme Court decision, McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail TransportationCo. 58 If, as will be suggested, there'is some
authority under the fourteenth amendment, and extensive authority under the thirteenth, for protecting women against private sex discrimination, federal courts will no longer be able to
deny women the full protection of existing federal legislation.5"
If there is no such authority, women will need not only ratification of the equal rights amendment but also a constitutional
equivalent to the thirteenth amendment to ensure their equal
treatment. 0
II. THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AND THIRTEENTH AMENDMENTS

A.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

1. The relationship between sections 5 and 1 of the fourteenth
amendment.
The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution provides in
section 1 that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Section 5 of the
amendment gives Congress "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the provisions of section 1. In Griffin v. Breckenridge," ' the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3)
applied to private racial discrimination and was a valid exercise
of thirteenth amendment power, but explicitly refused to consider whether the power to proscribe private discriminatory conduct might also derive from section 5 of the fourteenth amend58. 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976). See text accompanying notes 174-83 infra.
59. To the extent that the courts feel bound by the legislative history of certain congressional enactments, they may, of course, continue
to restrict the application of those statutes in a manner consistent with
that history. See note 39 supra &note 193 infra and accompanying text.
60. See note 55 supra.
61. 403 U.S. 88, 107 (1971). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
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ment. The question has not been answered by the Court since
that time.
The legislative history of the fourteenth amendment, which
theoretically should be helpful in determining the extent of
congressional authority, is confusing. Some statements in the
congressional debates indicate that the fourteenth amendment
was not intended to permit Congress to reach private conduct;
others suggest the contrary. 62 That a large portion of the debates consisted of descriptions of racial discrimination by private
persons provides some support for the second position. 63 One
might also argue that the division of the amendment into sections
1 and 5 was not meant to dilute the broad grant of legislative
authority apparent in the original draft, but was only an
alternative expression of the original statement that Congress
should have power to make all laws necessary and proper to ensure equality of rights and privileges.6 4 Whether the debates
support the notion that Congress may prohibit discriminatory
private conduct is, at best, ambiguous.
Although the congressional debates thus provide little guidance, the Supreme Court, at least since the Civil Rights Cases,65
has adhered to the principle that the language of section 1 of
62. For the reports of the legislative history of the fourteenth
FLACK, THE ADOPTION or THE FouRTEENTm AMEND(originally
mENT (1908); J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965)
published as THE ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951)); Avins, The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some Reflected
Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J.

amendment, see H.

331 (1967); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the
Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 ST.. L. REV. 5 (1949);

Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950).
63. See the reports of the debates in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTs 591-92 (1970); Frantz, Con-

gressionalPower to Enforce the FourteenthAmendment Against Private
YALE L.J. 1353, 1354-55 (1964).
64. See TEN BROEK, supra note 62, at 203-23.

Acts, 73

65. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court invalidated legislation prohibiting private discrimination in public accommodations. The Court declared:
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment (which is the one
relied on) . . . is prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory
Individual invasion of individual rights
upon the States ....
is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper
and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, . . . which denies to any
[citizen] the equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 10-11. See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638 (1883);

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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the fourteenth amendment forbids only state, as opposed to private, denials of equal protection. It is commonly accepted that
a state's failure to act affirmatively to prevent private discrimIn other
ination is not alone a state denial of equal protection.6
words, according to the conventional judicial view, there is no
violation of section 1 if one private individual discriminates
against another on the basis of race or sex and the state simply
fails to take measures to stop the discrimination.
Early Supreme Court decisions took the position that the language of section 1 determined the scope of congressional authority under section 5. In the Civil Rights Cases,67 United States
v. Harris,68 and United States v. Cruikshank,69 all of which considered the validity of federal legislation under the fourteenth
amendment, the construction of section 1 was a central issue.
For example, in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley stated
that the last section of the fourteenth amendment invested Congress with power to enforce only the prohibition contained in
section 1 and that section 1 operated only against "State laws
or State proceedings. '70 The Court emphasized the principles of
federalism underlying the state action limitation; the fourteenth
amendment was not intended to permit Congress to regulate private rights which were traditionally within the sovereign domain
71
of state legislatures.
66. Over the years, various advocates have "urged recognition of the
fact that there are two ways in which a state may deny equal protection
of the laws, see, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1833 (1866) (a
state may deny equal protection "either by prohibitory laws, or by a failure to protect" the citizen); Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term.Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protectionand California'sProposition

14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 73, 102, n.119 (1967) (a state that fails to secure
rights denies them); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 230 (1970)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (state inaction alone may convert customary
private discrimination into a denial of equal protection which Congress
had power to remedy under sections 1 and 5 of the fourteenth amendment). Despite these arguments, the Supreme Court has never held that
the mere failure to prevent private discrimination is a state denial of
equal protection. The Court has also failed to accept a similar argument
that, because the state always attributes some legal significance to
private action, private action can be reached through the fourteenth
amendment. See Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action"
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S.CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957).
67. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
68. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
69. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
70. 109 U.S. at 11. The same position was taken by the Court in
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638 (1883), and in United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875).
71. As the Supreme Court stated in the Civil Rights Cases, the four-
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Over the years, the Supreme Court has expanded its definition of state action to encompass more than "State laws or State
proceedings," but it has never abandoned the basic interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment that relates congressional authority
under section 5 to the state action language in section 1.72 If that
interpretation is still valid, the question left unresolved in Griffin
must be answered in the negative: Congress derives no authority
from the fourteenth amendment to interfere with purely private
discriminatory conduct and may prohibit private discrimination
73
only when it is connected with some affirmative act of the state.
Some commentators have argued, however, that Congress's
authority to control private conduct under section 5 is broader
than the judiciary's power under section 1. According to this
theory, federal courts may intervene in private discrimination
only if the state is affirmatively involved, but Congress can reach
such conduct without regard to state action or when Congress
itself has determined that the state is denying its citizens the
equal protection of the laws. 74 Although the argument is appeal-

ing to those who view with dismay the Supreme Court's narteenth amendment did not give Congress authority to "legislate upon
subjects which are within the domain of State legislation .

. . ."

109 U.S.

at 10-11. Although the Court recognized that state action may be restricted by Congress, it held that the amendment did not empower Congress to enact the equivalent of a "code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights." Id. Only if Congress legislated "against State
action, however put forth" would its action under section 5 not amount
to an "invasion of State sovereignty." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,
346 (1879). See also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1883);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549-51 (1875).
72. Even some of the statements in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966), which have been interpreted as acknowledging broad congressional authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, when
carefully read, link the scope of congressional authority to the state action language in section 1. See text accompanying notes 90-96 infra.
73. For more extensive discussions of congressional power to enforce the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Cohen, Congressional Power
to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STA. L. REV. 603
(1975); Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40
U. Cn . L. REv. 199, 226-39 (1971); Kalven, The Supreme Court, 1970
Term, 85 HARv. L. RaV. 3, 152-67; Note, FederalPower to Regulate Private
Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLum. L. Rnv. 449, 461-66 (1974).
74. See, e.g., Yackle, The Burger Court, "State Action," and Congressional Enforcement of the Civil War Amendments, 27 ALA. L. REV.
479 (1975). Frantz argues that the Civil Rights Cases, United States v.
Harris, and United States v. Cruikshank have been misread and stand
only for the proposition that Congress may not legislate pursuant to section 5 unless the state fails to fulfill its responsibility to ensure equal
protection of the laws to all of its citizens. F-rantz, supra note 63.
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rowed definition of "state action", it is difficult to support; it
necessarily rests on the assumption that the Court is prepared
to discard the holdings and the principles of federalism expressed
in the early cases. 75 The Jones case by analogy supports this
position, for the Supreme Court broadly construed congressional
power under the enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment, reversing earlier decisions that had strictly limited that
power. 76 The concurring opinions of six Justices in United
States v. Guest,77 suggesting that Congress has broad authority

to proceed against private persons under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, also may imply that the Court may move
beyond the strictures of the reasoning and the holdings of early
cases. Indeed, the most recent decision 7 8 to acknowledge Congress's broad authority under section 5 specifically relates that
authority to restrictions placed on overt state acti6n. 79 The fact
remains, however, that the Supreme Court has never specifically
discarded the state action limitation.
Two certain things can be said of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions in this area. First, congressional authority to
75. See note 71 supra.
76. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See text accompanying notes 157-61 infra. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966), broadly construing congressional authority under the
fifteenth amendment.
77. 383 U:S. 745 (1966). See text accompanying notes 92-98 infra.
78. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976) (Congres's fourteenth amendment enforcement power overrides state sovereignty and
Congress may provide for private suits against states).
79. Id. at 2671. It is interesting to contrast the treatment of federalstate relations in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976) with National
League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). In Usery the Supreme
Court held that the commerce clause does not empower Congress to
include state and local government employees within the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The first two courts to apply National League of Cities
refused to exempt public employers from the coverage of federal acts
prohibiting discrimination. In Usery v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 45
U.S.L.W. 2155 (D. Utah Aug. 31, 1976), the court held that state employers had to comply with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
notwithstanding National League of Cities, because the age discrimination provisions of the Act were enacted pursuant to section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. In Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist.,
423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. Iowa 1976), the court held the equal pay
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to school district
employees because it was only a minimal federal intrusion. "Discrimination in pay on the basis of sex is not an attribute of Sovereignty
within the contemplation of the Tenth Amendment which was the concern in National League of Cities... ." Id. at 638.
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legislate under section 5 may be independent of a judicial finding
that the state's actions have denied equal protection of the laws.
Justice Brennan took this position in Katzenbach v. Morgan8 °
in upholding a portion of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
A construction of § 5 that would require a judicial determination
that the enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condition of sustaining the congressional enactment would depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the
Amendment. It would confine the legislative power in this con-

text to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws
that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by
particularizing the "majestic generalities" of § 1 of the Amendment. 8 '

This position is supported by the oft-repeated generalization that
the fourteenth amendment made Congress, not the judiciary, the
chief guardian of protected rights.8 2 It is also consistent with
the Supreme Court's suggestion that Congress has more leeway
to enforce the thirteenth amendment through legislation than do
the courts by way of judicial decree.8 3
The Morgan opinion, however, does not give Congress license
to disregard the state action limitation of section 1. The Court
did not reach the question of Congress's power either to ignore
the state action limitation or to decide for itself whether sufficient state action exists; the state in Morgan had clearly acted
by imposing a literacy test as a qualification for voting. Furthermore, in a subsequent decision, Oregon v. Mitchell,8 4 a majority
of the Justices agreed that Morgan did not sanction congressional
definition of the substantive limitations of the fourteenth amendment, but only congressional authority to make factual determinations regarding equality of treatment in areas that clearly fell
80.

384 U.S. 641 (1966).

See Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Mor-

ganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 81 (Morgan stands for the proposi-

tion that where Court and Congress disagree about the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court will sometimes defer to Congress's interpretation); Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HAiv. L.
REv. 91, 99-108 (1966).

81. 384 U.S. at 648-49.
82. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,
678-80 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345
(1879). See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 781-84 (1966)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
83. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971), quoted
in text accompanying note 189 infra.
84. 400U.S. 112 (1970).
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within the scope of the amendment.8 5 Thus, although the Court
has indicated that the judiciary may defer to congressional factfinding as to whether discrimination exists, it has never suggested that courts must accept a congressional decision to ignore
or legislatively define the substantive state action requirement.8 6
The second statement that can be made with some certainty
about congressional power under section 5 is that Congress can
85. In Morgan, the Court had said:
It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment [regarding literacy tests imposed by the state], to assess and weigh
the various conflicting considerations-the risk or pervasiveness
of the discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness
of eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a
means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of
alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state
interests that would be affected by the nullification of the English literacy requirement ....

It is not for us to review the

congressional resolution of these factors.
384 U.S. at 653. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Justices
Brennan, White, and Marshall would have upheld the authority of Congress to prescribe an 18-year age limit on voter qualifications for state
elections. They took the position that the Supreme Court had clearly
made the exercise of state power to set voter qualifications subject to
the equal protection clause. On the basis of their assumption that the
Court had already decided this substantive issue, 400 U.S. at 241-42, the
Justices cited Morgan for the proposition that Congress is the appropriate
entity to resolve "complex factual questions" regarding discrimination in
the setting of voter qualifications. Id. at 247-49. Justices Stewart, Burger, and Blackmun appeared to adhere to the decision in Morgan but distinguished the Morgan facts from those in Mitchell:
But it is necessary to go much further [than the Court did in
Morgan] to sustain § 302. The state laws that it invalidates do
not invidiously discriminate against any discrete and insular minority. Unlike the statute considered in Morgan, § 302 is valid
only if Congress has the power not only to provide the means
of eradicating situations that amount to a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, but also to determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law What situations fall within the ambit of
the clause, and what state interests are "compelling."
Id. at 296. Justice Harlan's opinion clearly stated his position that Congress should not have the final say on matters of substantive constitutional interpretation. Id. at 204-09. Justices Black and Douglas did not
directly address the question.
86. The Court might defer to a legislative judgment on the state
action issue where the issue was not clearcut, because questions regarding the nature and degree of state involvement in private conduct may be as complex as the factual questions regarding the impact of overt state action were in Morgan. See note 85 supra. The
Court would not, however, permit Congress to exceed the constitutional
standard; it would still have to decide whether the congressional determination comported with its definition of state action. The following
comparison of judicial and congressional enforcement of the fourteenth
amendment also supports this interpretation:
The judiciary can and should deal with [private] discrimination
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reach some private conduct. In language paralleling that used
in interpreting the necessary and proper clause,8 7 the Supreme
Court has stated that section 5 means:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out
the object the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure
to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights
and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited,
is brought within the domain of congres88
sional power.

This interpretation gives some leeway to Congress to protect individuals from private discrimination but does not completely eliminate the state action restrictions imposed by section 1. For example, private individuals often act jointly with the state, and,
when so acting, their conduct can be regulated.8 9 To say that
Congress may reach some private conduct through the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, is not to
say that Congress may regulate all private conduct. In United
States v. Guest,9 0 several Justices of the Supreme Court may have
appeared to take this position, but a close reading demonstrates
the contrary.
In Guest the Court sustained an indictment brought under
18 U.S.C. section 241 against private individuals who had harassed blacks attempting to use public facilities. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, 91 did not confront the issue of congressional authority to prohibit private discrimination under section
accompanied by State neglect of the protection obligation, and
where highly significant affirmative involvements of the
state in the discriminatory course of conduct are visible. A point
will be reached where the weight of the problem shifts to the
question whether a prudent use is being made of the resources
of law to afford "protection." With issues in this area, Congress
is especially well equipped to deal. If Congress, judging on the
larger situation, concludes that state "protection" of an interest
going to the life of "equality" is inadequate, is unreasonably
short of prudently assessed possibility, "appropriate legislation,"
under section 5, might be the furnishing of a supplementary or
substitute set of remedies. There is no warrant for erecting a
set of artificial limitations on this legislative power.
Black, supra note 66, at 106.
87. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cL 18. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
88. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
89. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
90. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
91. In addition to the majority opinion and the concurrences discussed in the text, Justice Harlan wrote a concurrence and dissent. Id.
at 762.
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5 of the fourteenth amendment. Six Justices, however, went beyond the narrow basis of Stewart's opinion. Justices Clark,
Black, and Fortas stated that "there now can be no doubt that
the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress to enact laws
punishing all conspiracies-with or without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights. ' 92 Justices Brennan, Warren, and Douglas were even more explicit:
Although the Fourteenth Amendment itself, according to established doctrine, "speaks to the State or to those acting under the
color of its authority," legislation protecting rights created by
that Amendment, such as the right to equal utilization of state
facilities, need not be confined to punishing conspiracies in
which state officers participate. Rather, § 5 authorizes Congress
to make laws that it concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right created by and arising under that Amendment
. 93

The language used by these six Justices has sometimes been
interpreted to recognize congressional power to punish all private
conspiracies to discriminate.9 4 Such an interpretation, however,
takes the language out of context, for all members of the Court
recognized that the state was involved in the provision of the
facilities to which the Guest plaintiffs were denied accessY5 The
most precise and reasonable reading of these opinions is that Congress has the power to punish private individuals if it is necessary
to protect the right to equal utilization of state facilities. Just
as Congress can prevent state officials from denying equal access
92.

Id.

93. Id. at 782.
94. Some lower federal courts have read these opinions as holding
that section 5 gives Congress authority to prohibit all private discrimination. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, 211 (5th
Cir. 1971) (opinion withdrawn as moot); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227
(8th Cir. 1971) (en banc); Reichardt v. Payne, 396 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D.
Cal. 1975); Pennsylvania v. Local Union No. 542, 347 F. Supp. 268
(E.D. Pa. 1972). This reasoning, of course, eliminates the problem
discussed in notes 40-49 and accompanying text, for with the state action
requirement eliminated, congressional authority to reach private sex discrimination under the fourteenth amendment would presumably be as
broad as its authority to reach racial discrimination under that amendment or under the combined power of both the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments. As discussed in the text following this note, however,
these cases have extended the Guest rationale too far. The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of -this issue is more likely to be accepted should
the issue reach the Supreme Court. See Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High
School, 45 U.S.L.W. 2232 (7th Cir. Oct. 4, 1976).
95. 383 U.S. at 755; id. at 762 (Clark, J. concurring); id. at 774 (Harlan, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 780-81 (Brennan, J.
concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also note 98 infra.
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to state facilities, so it can prohibit private individuals from interfering with that access. 96 The concurring opinions, taken together and in context, do not support the proposition that Congress may protect private individuals from discrimination which
affects, for example, access to private facilities or property.
To date, the Supreme Court has neither reiterated nor applied the theory adopted in the Guest concurrences, and it is unlikely that it will do so. Of the Justices who joined in the Guest
concurring opinions, only one, Justice Brennan, remains on the
Court. 7 The others have been replaced by Justices who, for the
most part, are less predisposed to broad constitutional interpretation than were Fortas, Warren, or Douglas. Moreover, at least
one of the recent appointees to the Court interprets Guest to
require some connection between state action and private discrimination as a prerequisite to congressional legislation under
98
the fourteenth amendment.

96. See 383 U.S. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part):
No one would deny that Congress could enact legislation directing state officials to provide Negroes with equal access to state
schools, parks, and other facilities owned or operated by the
State. Nor could it be denied that Congress has the power to
punish state officers who, in excess of their authority and in violation of state law, conspire to threaten, harass and murder Negroes for attempting to use these facilities. And I can find no
principle of federalism nor word of the Constitution that denies
Congress power to determine that in order adequately to protect
the right to equal utilization of state facilities, it is also appropriate to punish other individuals-not state officers themselves
and not acting in concert with state officers-who engage in the
same brutal conduct for the same misguided purpose.
See also Cox, supra note 80, at 102.
One could well say, "Granted that the prohibitions in section 1
of the fourteenth amendment are addressed only to the states
and not to private persons, still the congressional power to enact
measures helping to effectuate those prohibitions may include
the regulation of private activities where that is a means of implementing the prohibition against the state." For example, a
law prohibiting discrimination against Negroes in the sale and
rental of housing could well be viewed as a means of bringing
about the break-up of the urban ghettos which are serious obstacles to the states' performance of their constitutional duty not
to discriminate in the quality of education and other public services.
97. Justices Warren, Douglas, Black, Clark, and Fortas are gone.
98. See the opinion of now Justice Stevens in Cohen v. Illinois Inst.
of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 828, n.27 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 943 (1976). The court found that a conspiracy by a private college to deprive a female faculty member of promotion and salary increases no better satisfied the requirements of section 1985(3) than the
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In summary, it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court will
uphold federal legislation against private sex discrimination under the fourteenth amendment, absent some connection between
that discrimination and the state. Neither Guest nor Morgan
suggests the contrary. Furthermore, the Court is still clearly
solicitous of the restraints on federal power imposed by our system of government and has reaffirmed the vitality of the concept of federalism99 underlying early restrictive interpretaprivate conspiracy to discriminate irrationally between criminal lawyers
and other prospective tenants of office space which was the subject of
its previous decision in Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 195-96 (7th
Cir. 1972). In Cohen the court reiterated the interpretation of Guest
which had served as one basis for its decision in Dombrowski.
[A]lthough there was disagreement within the Court on the
question whether defendants' private conduct would have been
proscribed if there had been no cooperative action by state officers, all members of the Court recognize the need for state involvement in the provision of facilities to which the victims of
the conspiracy were denied equal access. In short, the right secured by the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a right to protection against unequal treatment by a
State.
524 F.2d at 828 n.27.
The Cohen court also distinguished Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88 (1971):
The constitutional rights which were vindicated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Griffin ...

were not mere prohibitions

a limitation on state power ....

We recognize ..

against objectionable state action. That case held that a private
conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of their Thirteenth Amendment rights, or their right of interstate travel, was actionable
under § 1985(3). Neither of those constitutional rights is merely

that there

is language in Griffin which may indicate that the statute will
be construed to cover any invidiously discriminatory private
conspiracy, and that other circuits, without careful consideration
of the issue, have stated that state action is never an element
of a § 1985 (3) claim. We are satisfied, however, that the distinction between the two kinds of state involvement that may be
relevant in civil rights litigation-first, whether the defendant
has acted under color of state law, and, second, whether plaintiff's federal right is merely assertable against the State-requires consideration of the state action issue in cases bottomed
on an alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
524 F.2d at 828-29. See also Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, Inc., 508 F.2d 504,
507 (4th Cir. 1974).
This reasoning was extended by Murphy v. Mt. Carmel High School,
45 U.S.L.W. 2232 (7th Cir. Oct. 4, 1976), in which the court held that
section 5 provided no constitutional authority for Congress to interfere
with private infringement of rights protected by the fourteenth amendment and private conspiracies to interfere with first amendment rights
were not actionable under section 1985 (3).
99. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
But see Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637
(S.D. Iowa 1976); Usery v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 45 U.S.L.W.
2155 (D. Utah Aug. 31, 1976).
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tions of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, while Congress may
have authority which it has not yet utilized to reach some private
conduct, that authority is not plenary; it is constrained by the
judicial definition of the state action requirement of section 1.100
Because fourteenth amendment prohibitions on private sex
discrimination are limited by the state action concept, it is important to isolate those situations in which federal courts have
found a close enough connection between private conduct and
state action to satisfy the requirement. The definition of state
action adopted by the federal courts may determine the applicability of general statutes such as section 1985(3) to particular
instances of private sex discrimination""' and may also suggest
the outer limits of congressional authority to enact new legislation against such discrimination under the fourteenth amendment.

2.

02

Definitions of state action under section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment.

An interpretation of the fourteenth amendment that ties legislative authority to the Supreme Court's definition of state action has unfortunate consequences for those who wish to persuade Congress to enact new legislation or the courts to apply
existing legislation, such as section 1985(3), to private sex discrimination. The Court is in the process of redefining state ac100. See note 71 supra.
101. The state action concept is important to section 1985 (3) claims,

although this section can be applied as thirteenth amendment leg-

islation, see note 194 infra. Plaintiffs may rely on the fourteenth

amendment as the source of congressional authority to legislate against

private sex discrimination. A court could then apply section 1985(3)
only insofar as the challenged discrimination is proscribed by section 1
of the fourteenth amendment. In Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology,
524 F.2d 818, 828 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976), a
sex discrimination case, Justice Stevens as circuit judge found no connection between the state and the private sex discrimination. Noting
that the section 1985 (3) claim was based on the fourteenth amendment,
which is limited by the state action concept, he dismissed the complaint.

See note 46 supra. But cf. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971),

in which the Supreme Court held that constitutional authority for Con-

gress to prohibit the private conduct at issue flowed from both the thirteenth amendment and federal protection of the right to interstate travel.

Since private individuals had deprived plaintiff of these federal rights,
the conspiracy was actionable under section 1985 (3).
102. The state action concept would also determine the scope of congressional authority under the equal rights amendment.
supra.

See note 55
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tion in more restrictive terms than those used in the past. In
addition, the concept of state action has always been flexible,
which has resulted in sporadic recognition of a definitional
double standard that permits courts more easily to find state action in cases claiming race discrimination than in those alleging
other types of discrimination.' 0 3 This double standard implies
that in sex discrimination cases, "more" state action must exist
before the courts will countenance legislative interference with
private conduct; this creates a danger that those same courts will
restrictively interpret the scope of congressional power to ensure
equal treatment for women.
The Supreme Court has yet to settle on a precise definition
of state action.10 4 Neither descriptions of nor generalizations
about the cases in which the Court has found state action satisfactorily predicts the resolution of a state action issue. It is clear,
however, that the Court will not discern state action in private
conduct as readily as it once did. This reluctance appears even in
cases of race discrimination, although in the past the Court willingly scrutinized ostensibly private conduct to prevent the states
from perpetuating discrimination by more subtle means than
explicitly discriminatory statutes. The 1972 decision in Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis'0 5 was the first since 1935106 in which the
Supreme Court disposed of an allegation of racial discrimination
on the ground that no state action could be found.
In Jackson v. MetropolitanEdison Co.,' 07 the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that the termination of services by a privately-owned utility company was state action. This decision
demonstrates the Court's new analytical method. Whether state
103. See text accompanying notes 117-40 infra.
104. See Bassett, The Reemergence of the "State Action" Requirement in Race Relations Cases, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 39 (1972); Burke &
Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights, 46 S.

L. REv. 1003, 1034-1109 (1973); Note, State Action and the Burger
Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974) [hereinafter cited as State Action]; Note,
State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to PriCAL.

vate Activity, 74 CoLUm L. REv. 656 (1974).

See also Black, supra note

66; Van Alstyne &Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 4 (1961).
105. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). In Moose Lodge, a black guest at a private
club was refused service because of his race. The Court held that the
state-imposed regulatory scheme enforced by the state liquor board in
relation to the club's liquor license did not constitute "state action;" but
another regulatory provision, discussed in note 125 infra, was held to be
state action.
106. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). See State Action, supra note 104, at 847 n.37.
107. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).

19771

SEX DISCRIMINATION

action exists, the Court held, does not depend on the combined
effect of state and private entanglements, but rather on whether
state involvement in any single aspect of a private individual's
conduct amounts to state action. Consequently, the Court evaluated separately each claimed connection between the state and
the private utility and concluded that neither the state's grant
of monopoly status to Metropolitan Edison, nor the fact that the
company provided an essential public service, nor the state's approval of Metropolitan Edison's regulations justified a finding
of state action.' 0 8
Jackson also indicated that the existence of state action depends on whether there is a specific nexus between the state's
entanglement with a private individual and the alleged discriminatory conduct. 10 9 The use of this approach may close the federal courts to cases that a few years earlier had satisfied the state
action requirement. For example, in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority,"0 the Court would have had difficulty finding the specific nexus that Jackson requires in the simple fact
that the city leased building space to a restaurant which had
a racially discriminatory service policy. Yet in Burton the Supreme Court found state action.
Whether Jackson's analytical approach will affect the state
action question in race discrimination litigation, or will be limited
to cases involving due process claims or other types of discrimination, is problematic."' A number of lower federal courts hearing
108.

The Court held that no state action -could be discerned, over the

objection of the dissenting Justice that: "[it is not enough to examine

seriatim each of the factors upon which a claimant relies and to dismiss
each individually as being insufficient to support a finding of state action. It is the aggregate that is controlling." Id. at 360. See generally
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HAav. L. REv. 47, 139 (1975).
109. 419 U.S. at 351 (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972)).
110. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
111. Although the Jackson Court specifically relied on state action

cases alleging race discrimination in reaching its conclusion, 419 U.S. at

349-51, it did not explicitly mandate application of the Jackson analysis
to race discrimination cases. Moreover, in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974), at least two Justices seemed to reject the requirement that a specific nexus be shown between state action and racial
discrimination. Id. at 582 (White & Douglas, JJ., concurring) ("it is perfectly clear that ... the State itself need not make, advise, or authorize
the private decision to discriminate that involves the State in the practice
of segregation or would appear to do so in the minds of ordinary citizens"). Given the additional fact that the standard for testing state action appears to vary according to the type of discrimination, see, e.g.,
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sex discrimination cases, however, have unquestioningly adopted
both the Jackson seriatim method of analysis and the nexus
standard,1 12 with unfortunate results for plaintiffs.
In Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology,1 3 for example,
the fourteenth amendment claim of a plaintiff who alleged sex
discrimination in employment by an ostensibly private university
was rejected. Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Stevens held
that state action must be established by demonstrating some affirmative state encouragement or approval of the alleged sex discrimination.1 4
Stevens also employed the Jackson seriatim
method of analysis,"15 and considered the alleged connections between the state and the private university in four separate parts:
1) the use of the name of the state; 2) financial and other state
support; 3) pervasive state regulation; and 4) failure of the state
to take affirmative action to stop the discrimination. Other lower
federal courts have similarly relied on Jackson's seriatim and
nexus analyses, usually without considering whether the standards set forth in Jackson are applicable to sex discrimination
cases.""
Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir. 1974); James

v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1974); Wahba v. New York Univ.,
492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974); Grafton v. Brooklyn Law School, 478 F.2d
1137 (2d Cir. 1973); Kirksey v. Thelig, 351 F. Supp. 727, 731-32 (D. Colo.
1972), it is conceivable that Jackson will not govern racial discrimination
cases. In Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976)
(en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 186 (1976), however, the court determined that the Jackson standard applied to race discrimination on the
ground that the Supreme Court, in its Jackson opinion, had relied on
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), and Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), both race discrimination

cases.
112. See cases cited in note 116 infra.
113. 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).
114. Id. at 824 n.21.
115. Id. at 823-26.
116. See, e.g., Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d
1328, 1332 (3d Cir. 1975); New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States
Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d 856, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1975); Junior Chamber of
Commerce of Kansas City v. Missouri State Junior Chamber of Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031, 1033 (8th Cir. 1975). But see Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 407 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975); Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974), in which the courts
rejected both Jackson methods. In Weise, the court considered five
state action factors in the aggregate and noted further that the degree to which the state was involved in the discriminatory activity
through regulation was not a sine qua non to a finding of state action. 522 F.2d at 407. In Rackin, state action was found without a
specific nexus since a symbiotic relationship between the private discrim-
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Even without following the Jackson precedent, lower federal
courts have been reluctant to find state action in sex discrimination cases in which, if a claim of racial discrimination were
pressed, state action would probably be discerned. In race discrimination cases, the Supreme Court was long ago forced to
adopt a sophisticated definition of state action in order to prevent
circumvention of the fourteenth amendment, since states often
encouraged individuals to carry on what were once state-enforced
racially discriminatory policies. But the Court has not yet decided a case in which it has been forced to consider what degree
of state involvement in otherwise private sex discrimination constitutes state action. 117 This issue has been raised in lower federal courts,"18 but, in the absence of a Supreme Court decision
applying a sophisticated state action analysis to sex discrimination, these courts have been reluctant to follow the precedent
set by the race discrimination cases.
Some courts openly adhere to a "double standard" of state
inator and the state existed. The court also considered the fadtors pertaining to the state action question in the aggregate. 386 F. Supp. at
1002-04.
117. Every recent sex discrimination case considered by the Supreme
Court has challenged a specific statute or regulation which, by its terms,
created a classification based on sex. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976)
(state statute prohibited sale of 3.2 percent beer to males under 21
and females under 18); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (state
statute assigned men and women different ages of majority); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (men received less survivor's benefits than women under Social Security Act); Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (servicemen treated differently for promotion purposes than servicewomen); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974) (state statute gave widows but not widowers a property tax exemption); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (federal statute
gave married servicewomen different dependent benefits than married
servicemen); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (state statute gave a preference to men over women when both were otherwise equally qualified
for the job as administrator of an estate). See Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, 23 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 235 (1975); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 617 (1974).
The Supreme Court may consider the state action question in the
near future, since the issue has already been litigated in the lower federal
courts in Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976), and Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).
118. Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524
F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Magill v.
Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975).
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action in fourteenth amendment litigation. A district court, for
example, discussing the merits of a sex discrimination claim in
King v. Little League Baseball, Inc.,119 stated:
If the present case concerned racial discrimination, defendant
Little League, like the boys' club in Statom [v. Board of Commissioners, 233 Md. 57, 195 A.2d 41 (1963)] might well be
deemed to have acted under color of law. But state action is
found more readily when racial
120 discrimination is in issue than
when other rights are asserted.
Instances of open adherence to a double standard are, however, rare. Far more numerous are the courts that do not openly
advert to, but whose conclusions suggest the existence of a double
standard. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, has been equivocal. On the one hand, it has acknowledged
that a double standard exists;' 21 on the other hand, it has pufported to apply the same standard in sex discrimination cases
that it would apply in race cases. In Girardv. 94th Street & Fifth
22
Avenue Corporation,1
for example, the court stated that it was
119. 505 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1974).
120. This is the district court's language, reported id. at 266. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court, but did not adopt the quoted
language, relying instead "upon a more immediate basis for affirmance."
Id. at 267.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also implied that there
may be a double standard on the state action issue. In a case challenging
a hospital's elective abortion policy under the fourteenth amendment, the
court declined to find state action by stating that the "most obvious distinguishing factor [between Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority and
the case at hand] is that Orange Memorial Hospital is not accused of
racial discrimination." Greco v. Orange Memorial Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d
873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975). Compare Simkins v.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 938 (1964) (race discrimination; receipt and use of Hill-Burton
funds by private hospital amounts to state action) with the approach of
the district court which was reversed in Doe v. Charleston Area Medical
Center, Inc., 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975) (abortion; district court had
held receipt and use of Hill-Burton funds does not amount to state action; court of appeals reversed, finding state action). See also Taylor
v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
948 (1976); Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973)
(abortion; receipt and use of Hill-Burton funds does not amount to state
action).
121. See Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975)
("Plaintiffs contend that we should put sex discrimination in the same
category of offensiveness as race discrimination. We are not, however,
engaged in an all-or-nothing, pigeon-hole form of jurisprudence, and it
is not necessary [to decide that issue in this case]."). See also text
accompanying note 134 infra.
122. 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976).
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using the same, less onerous, state action test used in race discrimination cases, but the finding of no state action casts doubts
on the accuracy of the court's characterization of its standard.
The plaintiff in Girardhad alleged that the board of directors of
a cooperative apartment building refused to consent to the assignment of a lease to her solely because she was a woman. Although a state court had enforced the board's refusal, albeit perhaps without knowledge of the reasons for it, the court of appeals
found no state action which would subject the board of directors
to the proscription of the fourteenth amendment.
1 23
The facts in Girardparalleled those in Shelley v. Kraemer,'
a case in which the Supreme Court found state action in the
state judiciary's enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant
regulating the sale of land. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit distinguished the factual situation in Shelley on the following grounds:
The contested provision in Shelley was racially discriminatory
on its face. The lease provision in question here, requiring consent of the board of directors before transfer is effective, can
only be described as neutral; there is no suggestion24of any prohibition of transfer of ownership on the basis of sex.1
Since the Supreme Court has never made the state's knowledge
or intent to discriminate the determinative factor in evaluating
the state action issue, the distinction drawn by the Second Circuit
is hardly significant enough to merit a different outcome than
that in Shelley. One might reasonably conclude that the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in spite of its language, was
25
using a double standard.
123. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
124. Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976).
125. This is not to say that the result reached in Girard is not supportable on any other grounds, but simply that there is no basis for the
distinction which the court chose to make. If the Supreme Court had
considered intent dispositive of the state action issue, the facially nondiscriminatory state liquor license regulations in Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), would have shielded the private discrimina-

tion of the club from the restraints of the fourteenth amendment, instead

of furnishing the Court with a reason for finding state action. In Moose
Lodge, a liquor control board regulation that required all private clubs

to adhere to their own by-laws was held to give rise to state action under

the fourteenth amendment when a by-law of a private club prohibited
serving blacks. But see note 105 supra. See also Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state action was found in the fact
that the state leased space to a private restaurant which turned out to

have a racially discriminatory service policy); Jackson v. Metropolitan
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Another example illustrates the point. In Gilmore v. City
of Montgomery,'2 6 the Supreme Court stated that if government,
rather than merely making public facilities available to private
segregated organizations, becomes involved, for example, in the
scheduling process for use of the public facilities, state action
may be present. 1 27 In spite of Gilmore, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, in Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference,' 28 found no state action in an arrangement which gave
the Avonworth Baseball Conference, a state-chartered, private,
non-profit organization which refused to admit girls, access
to public baseball fields. This finding was made in spite of the
facts that: 1) the fee which was normally charged for use of
public facilities was waived in the case of the Conference; 2) the
Conference could not operate without the use of public facilities;
and 3) the Avonworth School Board permitted the Conference
to use school facilities for advertising purposes, for its annual
organizational meeting, and for registration for the Confer29

ence.1

Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In Jackson, the Court required a showing of a specific nexus between the state and the private discrimination;
this could be interpreted as incorporating a knowledge requirement into
the state action analysis and might be used to support the outcome in
Girard. Unless the same nexus limitation is used in race discrimination
cases, however, a double standard would still exist.
126. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
127. If ... the city or other governmental entity rations otherwise freely accessible recreational facilities, the case for state action will naturally be stronger than if the facilities are simply
available to all comers without condition or reservation. Here,
for example, petitioners allege that the city engages in scheduling soft-ball games for an all-white church league and provides
balls, equipment, fields, and lighting. The city's role in that situation would be dangerously close to what was found to exist
in Burton ....
Id. at 574.
128. 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975).
129. But see Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344,
347 (1st Cir. 1975) (citing Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556
(1974)) (city's rationing of parks primarily for the Little League
amounted to state action).
Other instances exist in which courts faced with sex discrimination
claims have reached conclusions which appear to conflict with those
reached in similar cases involving race discrimination. Compare Junior
Chamber of Commerce of Kansas City v. Missouri State Junior Chamber
of Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031 (8th Cir. 1975) (no state action, although
45 percent of all money received and distributed by United States Jaycees came from federal government and was used to train only men for
future civic and business responsibilities), and Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester v. United States Jaycees, Tulsa, Okla., 495 F.2d 883
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026 (1974) (no state action although
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Some courts, of course, have reached the same state action
findings in similar sex and race discrimination cases, 13 0 and
it may be argued that the inconsistencies described above
are simply a manifestation of the confusion which exists with
respect to all state action litigation. 131 The inconsistencies
are, however, sufficiently numerous to prompt consideration of
whether different treatment of the state action issue in race and
sex discrimination cases is justifiable. The conclusion reached
may affect interpretations of the scope of congressional authority
132
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
The basis for the proposition that state action standards
should vary with the type of discrimination is relatively plain.
According to one influential proponent of a double standard, racial discrimination is an invidious, reprehensible practice which,
if unchecked, will have a profound effect on the nation; judicial
scrutiny of racially discriminatory conduct must therefore be
particularly rigorous. 33 A similar rationale is given by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit:
defendant male-only organization received tax benefits, federal contracts
and $985,000 in federal monies), with McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F.

Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (state action in tax exemption for racially discriminatory fraternal order) and Smith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n
of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972) (state action in racially
discriminatory policies of YMCA because it enjoyed tax-exempt status,
utilized city property, conducted recreational programs for the public,
and derived 20 percent of its income from the city). See also Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1913) (state's provision of free textbooks to racially segregated private schools constituted state action); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 943 (1976) (sex discrimination; school received state financial
support and benefit from state's powers of eminent domain, but no state
action found).
130. Compare Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (race
discrimination; city enforced trespass laws against customer of segre-

gated restaurant), with Johnson v. Heineman Candy Co., Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 714 (E.D. Wis., 1975) (sex discrimination; city agreed to handle

male-only restaurant's private prosecution of women customers). See
also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (race discrimination by osten-

sibly private group which performed essential political function); Smith
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1943); Korzenik v. Marrow, 401 F. Supp. 77
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (sex discrimination by private group performing essential political function).

131. The question may be further confused by the possibility that
the different results reached depend on whether it is the state itself that

is sued or simply the private discriminator. See Yackle, supra note 74,
at 522-23 n.175.
132. See text following note 103 supra.
133. Black, supra note 66, at 69-70. See also H. FRIFNDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AM THE PULIc-ParVATE PENUMBRA 21 (1969).
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[A] consideration of whether there is state action necessarily entails a balancing process. . . . As the conduct complained
of becomes more offensive, and as the nature of the dispute becomes more amenable to resolution by a court, the more appropriate it is to subject the issue to judicial scrutiny. This explains
the willingness to find state action in racial discrimination cases
although the same state-private relationship might not trigger
such a finding in a case involving a different dispute over a different interest. Class-based discrimination is perhaps the practice most fundamentally opposed to the stuff of which our
national heritage is composed, and by far the most evil form of
discrimination has been that based on race. It should hardly be
surprising, then, that in race discrimination cases courts have
been particularly vigilant in requiring the states to avoid support of otherwise private discrimination, and that where the conduct has been
less offensive a greater degree of tolerance has
13 4
been shown.
Most courts and individuals that advert to this proposition buttress their argument by citing the historical purpose of the four-

teenth amendment to prevent racial discrimination. 13 5 In effect,
they adopt an approach to fourteenth amendment interpretation
that limits the scope of the amendment precisely to its original
intent, an interpretation which the Supreme Court has not
adopted.' 3 6
Until recently, it could have been persuasively urged that
because charges of race discrimination received stricter scrutiny
on the merits of the equal protection claim than charges of other
134. Weise v. Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 406 (2d Cir. 1975) (Smith,
J.) (citations omitted). See also the statement made by Justice Stevens
during his nomination hearings that "I think [blacks] are a more disadvantaged group in the history of our Country than the half of the population that is female." Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be a Justice
of the Supreme Court: Hearings before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 16 (1975).
135. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 51-54 (1872);
Black, supra note 66, at 70-71. Although addressed to another aspect
of fourteenth amendment interpretation, the following remarks are
illuminating:
I limit this generalization to the racial question on the assumption already stated that the fourteenth amendment marks racial
groups ... as groups against whose interest in immunity from
discrimination no state measures of any kind may be justified
....
On the other hand, a [state] constitutional provision forbidding the legislature and subdivisions of California from interfering with discrimination in housing, so long as that discrimination were based on sex . . . would not fall within the principle
put forward. Such a provision might be 'arbitrary' and so fall
under either a due process or generalized equal protection ban.
But women [do not] enjoy any general federal constitutional
immunity against all state measures placing them at any disadvantage.
Id. at 82.
136. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 178-79
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 12627 (1970).
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types of class discrimination, the Supreme Court would similarly
scrutinize the state action issue. At least with respect to sex
discrimination, however, that argument is no longer supportable.
The terminology of "strict scrutiny" and "suspect classifications"
may linger, but it is apparent from recent Supreme Court decisions that the Court is abandoning its practice of converting a
description of the type of discriminatory classification into a prejudgment of the constitutionality of that classification.1 3 7 Litigants claiming a denial of equal protection on the basis of sex
have found the Court willing to closely analyze the government's
justifications for its law.138 Thus, in spite of the historical purpose of the fourteenth amendment, the Court looks carefully at
class discrimination based on factors other than race. 39 If the
137. The Supreme Court appears to be developing a standard more
rigorous than the "rational relationship" test for some cases which do
not warrant strict scrutiny. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rgv. 1, 17-18 (1972);
Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO.
L.J. 1071 (1974). In particular, the Supreme Court's approach in Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971), and its application of Reed to other
sex discrimination cases, such as Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), indicates that the "two-tiered" equal protection analysis is in disfavor.
Cf. Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 467 (1976) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting)
(Justice Rehnquist argues that discrimination against women should be
more carefully scrutinized than that against men. The majority of the
Court preferred to give equal scrutiny to discrimination claims of both
sexes.). One might still argue that sex classifications should be denominated "suspect" and that their denomination as such should affect the
outcome of sex discrimination litigation, but it is not the purpose here to
resolve that debate. The point is simply that the question is not as
critical as has sometimes been assumed. Compare, for example, Mr.
Justice Douglas's opinions in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682
(1973), and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1975) (dissenting
opinion), where he maintained that sex classifications are suspect,
with his position in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1975), in which he
upheld the validity of a classification based on sex.
138. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976); Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 419 U.S. 822 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975). In none of these cases did the Supreme Court characterize sex
as a suspect classification, but in each it carefully scrutinized the government's rationale for the classification.
139. The Supreme Court has in the past indicated that the legal status of women was "different" and that the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause therefore did not prQtect them to the same
extent that it might protect other citizens. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (the right to practice
law is not one of the privileges and immunities of a woman's citizenship). In addition, in In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894), the Supreme Court upheld the right of Virginia to construe "person" as includ-
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historical purpose argument does not prevent close judicial scrutiny when a plaintiff alleges a denial of equal protection solely
on the basis of sex, it should not be resurrected to justify a
"double standard" in deciding state action issues.
There is room for hope that any temptation to treat state
action issues differently in race and sex discrimination cases will
be resisted. There are courts that have recognized the possibility
that some forms of discrimination will give rise to a finding of
state action more easily than others, but have found no reason
to distinguish between race and sex discrimination. 140 The
courts that make such a distinction, however, may carry it over
to interpretations of congressional authority to legislate pursuant
to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
3.

Conclusion

The state action limitation in section 1 of the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution does not totally bar Congress
from regulating private sex discrimination. As long as that discrimination is linked to state action, Congress can probably prohibit it. There is little reason to believe, however, that the Supreme Court itself will ever ignore, or permit Congress to ignore,
the state action limitation; judicial definitions of state action will
therefore restrict the type of legislation that can constitutionally
be enforced against private sex discrimination. Because judicial
definitions of state action have narrowed in recent years and because the judiciary has, at times, utilized a double standard for
sex discrimination cases, congressional authority to legislate
against private sex discrimination under the fourteenth amend141
ment may be insufficient to fully protect women.
ing only males and thus prevent the female petitioner from practicing
law in that state. Neither of these decisions, however, could be justified
under any of the current forms of equal protection analysis. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).

140. See, e.g., Korzenik v. Marrow, 401 F. Supp. 77, 81 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), a$ 'd, 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1976); New York City Jaycees v. United
States Jaycees, 377 F. Supp. 481, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 512 F.2d 856
(2d Cir. 1975); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F.
Supp. 433, 439 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Brown and his colleagues in their discussion of the equal rights
amendment take the position that the rights involved rather than the
class claiming discriminatory treatment should affect the amount of state
action the plaintiff must demonstrate. The Equal Rights Amendment,
supra note 55, at 905-06.
141. The narrowing of the judicial definition of state action might
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Were the equal rights amendment ratified, and the importance of equal rights for women publicly acknowledged, the existence of a double standard under the fourteenth amendment could
not limit legislation prohibiting private sex discrimination. The
equal rights amendment contains an enforcement clause that
would give Congress the same authority to legislate against sex
discrimination as the fourteenth amendment gives against racial
discrimination. Even under the equal rights amendment, however, if the court's analysis of the state action issue adopted in
Jackson were engrafted onto the new amendment's enforcement
clause, congressional power to prohibit private sex discrimination
would still be strictly limited.
There is, however, another source of congressional power,
for the most part ignored by the courts, which may make arguments pertaining to congressional authority under either the
fourteenth or the equal rights amendment merely academic. Because the thirteenth amendment contains no state action requirement, it could provide a firm basis for congressional attacks on
private sex discrimination.

B.

THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

Recent Supreme Court interpretations of the thirteenth
amendment 14 2 appear to recognize extensive congressional authority to legislate against all private discrimination. 148 The
principle that Congress may reach private conduct under the
thirteenth amendment was early established by the Supreme
Court.144 Within the last ten years, the Court has expansively
interpreted the amendment to permit Congress to enact legislation affecting a broad range of private deprivations of "'fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom.'"'145
have some effect on the enforcement of the equal rights amendment, although the judicial implementation of a double standard should not.
See text following note 140 supra.
142. Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
143.
144.

See text accompanying notes 157-66 infra.
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23 (1883).

145. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968) (quoting
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)). See text accompanying notes
158-61 infra.
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The Supreme Court has long emphasized that the thirteenth
amendment does not apply only to members of the black race.
In fact, the same Court that doubted that the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment would ever be interpreted
to prohibit any action of a state "not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their
race,' 1

46

stated with respect to the thirteenth amendment:

We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this
protection. Both the language and the spirit of these articles are
to have their fair and just weight in any question of construction.
Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the
Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any
other kind of slavery, now or hereafter.147
The amendment, according to the Court, was "a denunciation of
a condition and not a declaration in favor of a particular
people."'14
At the same time that it established the application of the
thirteenth amendment to all persons, however, the Supreme
Court strictly construed congressional power to reach only the
eradication of the specific conditions of slavery and involuntary
servitude. The thirteenth amendment was viewed merely as the
constitutional means for prohibiting slavery and involuntary
servitude as institutions; the Court identified the fourteenth
amendment as the constitutional prohibition of simple racial dis149
crimination.
146. 'Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872).
147. Id. at 72.
148. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1906). See also
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240-41 (1911); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 23 (1883).
149. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872). Notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary in the legislative history, see, e.g., ten Broek, Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, 39 CALIF. L.
REv. 171 (1951), the view that the thirteenth amendment prohibited only
slavery and involuntary servitude, and not discriminations of lesser gravity, is implicit in later Supreme Court decisions upholding federal legislation against peonage, Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), and
outlawing state statutes enforcing compulsory labor, Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219 (1911). As late as 1926 this view still persisted. In that
year, the Court in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926), cited
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), for the proposition that "the
Thirteenth Amendment denouncing slavery and involuntary servitude,
that is, a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another, does
not in other matters protect the individual rights of persons of the negro
race." In Corrigan, a racially restrictive covenant limiting the sale of
property was at issue.
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968), the Court
read the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), as an early recognition
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The early thirteenth amendment decisions of the Supreme
Court were not, however, unanimous. The proposition that the
thirteenth amendment simply abolished slavery or involuntary
servitude was strongly opposed by Justice Harlan, who argued
in the Civil Rights Cases that if one were to accept the majority's
position that Congress had thirteenth amendment authority only
to abolish slavery, section 2 of the amendment would be superfluous."
Despite Harlan's position that there were certain
rights "necessarily inhering in freedom"'151 which the thirteenth
amendment protects, the majority of the Supreme Court found
the Louisiana statute in Plessy v. Ferguson constitutional because "a legal distinction between the white and colored races
[included in the statute] ... has" no tendency to destroy the
of congressional authority to legislate against private discrimination not
amounting to the imposition of slavery or involuntary servitude, but that
broad reading is not precisely correct. See text accompanying notes 15762 infra. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22, the Supreme Court,
in discussing legislative action taken for the protection of blacks, had
noted:
Congress, as we have seen, by the Civil Rights Bill of 1866,
passed in view of the Thirteenth Amendment.

.

., undertook to

wipe out these burdens and disabilities, the necessary incidents
of slavery, constituting its substance and visible form; and to
secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard
to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the
essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens ....

[At] that time (in 1866) Congress did not assume,

under the authority given by the Thirteenth Amendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights of men and races in
the community; but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and
the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential
distinction between freedom and slavery.
The Court, however, was only describing the civil rights legislation. It
did not specifically decide "whether this legislation was fully authorized
by the Thirteenth Amendment alone, without the support which it afterward received from the Fourteenth Amendment .

.

. 21 Id.

Moreover,

the Court went on to note that the thirteenth amendment "simply abolished slavery," id. at 23, that the power of Congress under the thirteenth
amendment only extended to "slavery and its incidents," id., and that
"mere discriminations on account of race or color" were not badges of
slavery, id. at 25. The final holding of the decision, that Congress had
no authority to legislate against private discrimination in the furnishing
of public accommodations calls into question any interpretation that
would find in the Civil Rights Cases an endorsement of broad congressional authority under the thirteenth amendment to reach discrimination
that fell short of slavery or servitude. In light of Jones, however, that
authority is now firmly established.
150. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 34-35, 37 (1883).
151. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
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legal equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.' 1 52 Similarly in Hodges v. United States,153 the
Court rejected Harlan's argument that the thirteenth amendment
protected the right of black persons to work, 154 while in the Civil
Rights Cases'5 5 the Court did not agree with Harlan that the
thirteenth amendment gave Congress the right to legislate
against private discrimination in public accommodations. 15
Within the last ten years, however, dating from the landmark
decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 1 5 7 the Supreme Court

has adopted Harlan's position.
In Jones, the Supreme Court, stating that "Congress has the
power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation," . 5 8 upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute which
152. Id. at 543.
153. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
154. Id. at 20, 35-36.
155. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
156. Harlan was not the only Justice who would have interpreted
the thirteenth amendment to prohibit more than just the institution of
slavery. Justice Day joined him in dissent in Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906). In a dissent to the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 90 (1872), Justices Field and Bradley argued that the right
to pursue a chosen occupation was secured by the thirteenth amendment.
Moreover, Justices Bradley and Swayne, sitting as circuit judges, adopted
a broad interpretation of the thirteenth amendment in United States v.
Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151), and United States
v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C. La. 1874) (No. 14,896), af'd, 92 U.S.
542 (1875). See also the dissent of Justices Bradley and Swayne in
Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1871).
157. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Legislative history supports the Jones interpretation. See Buchanan (pt. 1), supra note 41, at 1-34. Buchanan
concludes from his discussion of the legislative history that both proponents and opponents of the amendment interpreted it very expansively:
While the congressional debates strongly support the conclusion
that the thirteenth amendment was intended to protect all races,
secure equal protection under the law to all racial groups, and
confer on Congress a broad power to define and prohibit badges
of slavery, other conclusions emerge less clearly. The debates
hint at the existence of congressional power to regulate private
acts of discrimination. . . . Moreover, the debates suggest the

existence of a still more pervasive congressional power-the
power to regulate private acts of discrimination based on factors
other than race. The prophecies of wives becoming equal to
their husbands and women equal to men [CONG. GLOBE, 38th

Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) ] evince congressional awareness that
the badge-of-slavery concept might well embrace all acts,
whether private or governmental, based on any form of arbitrary class prejudice.
Id. at 22 (citations omitted). See also ten Broek, supra note 149.
158. 392 U.S. at 440. The Court applied the test of congressional au-
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had been applied to prohibit private racial discrimination in the
sale of property. According to the Court, "the badges and incidents of slavery-its 'burdens and disabilities'-included restraints upon 'those fundamental rights which are the essence
of civil freedom, namely, the same right ... to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.' ,,1"
By specifically overruling the restrictive interpretation of congressional power in Hodges,1 0 the Supreme Court recognized, as did Harlan's early dissents, that the thirteenth
amendment authorized Congress to protect "fundamental rights
'1 61
which are the essence of civil freedom.
Subsequent decisions have affirmed the Court's discussion in
Jones of Congress's expansive authority under the thirteenth
amendment. 62 The only questions voiced since Jones have been
those of Justices White and Rehnquist writing in dissent in Runyon v. McCrary.6 3 In Runyon, the majority of the Supreme Court
permitted blacks who had been excluded from private schools
solely because of their race to sue for relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1981. The only reference to whether Congress has the power
to prohibit that form of private discrimination was a brief statement that Jones had recognized congressional authority rationally
to determine what constitutes the badges and incidents of slavery.0 4 Justices White and Rehnquist did not question the power
of Congress to ban racial discrimination in private schools 6 5 but
merely the assumption, which they believed implicit in the
Court's language, that Congress has authority to legislate against
thority articulated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819). Id. at 443.
159. 392 U.S. at 441. In support of this statement, the Court cited
to some rather ambiguous language in the Civil Rights Cases. See note
149 supra and accompanying text.
160. 392 U.S. at 411 n.78.
161. Id. at 441.
162. Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (1976); Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (the reference in Griffin to "classbased" discrimination may imply that the thirteenth amendment protections extend to non-racial classes; see note 43 supra). Affirmance is implicit in other decisions such as Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229 (1969), and Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431 (1973). No Justice has pursued the limited dissent in Jones,
ironically written by another Justice Harlan, which questioned the majority's expansive interpretation of the thirteenth amendment. Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 476-77 (1968).
163. 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2613-14 (1976).
164. Id. at 2594.
"165. Id. at 2605 n.2.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:313

"every racially motivated refusal to contract by a private individual."' 6 Thus, while there may be some disagreement as to
precisely which deprivations constitute the imposition of a badge
of slavery, all the Justices concluded that Congress has greater
authority than that recognized in the early thirteenth amend16 7
ment decisions.
Taking into account only the cases discussed so far, it is still
far from certain that the amendment authorizes Congress to prohibit private sex discrimination. Arguably these decisions permit
Congress to define for itself the badges and incidents of slavery,
but it still cannot completely disregard the past legal status of
the class of persons it decides to protect from private discrimination. In United States v. Harris, 68 for example, the Supreme
Court held that Congress had exceeded its authority under the
thirteenth amendment by enacting a statute that could be applied
to protect free white persons against discrimination. 16 9 Jones,
which established the broad authority of Congress to define the
badges and incidents of slavery, arose out of a case of private
racial discrimination, and the decision heavily emphasized the
past legal status of blacks.' 70 Thus, based on these decisions,
one might reasonably take the position that, while Congress can
define the badges and incidents of slavery, it can do so only if
those badges and incidents are connected with a past legal status
17
amounting to slavery or involuntary servitude. '
166. Justices White and Rehnquist felt it
doubtful that all such refusals could be considered badges or incidents of slavery within Congress' proscriptive power under the
Thirteenth Amendment. A racially motivated refusal to hire a
Negro or a white babysitter or to admit a Negro or a white to
a private association cannot be called a badge of slavery ....
Id. at 2613.
167. See generally Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
168. 106 U.S.629 (1882).
A law under which two or more free white persons could be punished for conspiring . . .for the purpose of depriving another
free white citizen of a right accorded by the law of the state
to all classes of persons ... clearly cannot be authorized by the
amendment which simply prohibits slavery and involuntary
servitude.
Id. at 641.
169. The Court questioned the rationale of Harrisin Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971), but did not discuss the assumption that
Congress could not reach white persons under the thirteenth amendment.
170. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 (1968).
171. See Buchanan (pt. 7), supra note 41, at 882 (the Jones definition
of a badge of slavery may depend "on the showing of a historical link
between the victimized class receiving congressional protection and slavery as it existed in the antebellum South"); Note, The "New" Thirteenth
Amendment: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 82 HAnv. L. REv.1294, 1308 (1969).
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Under this interpretation, the Court's recent thirteenth
amendment decisions give Congress authority to legislate against
private sex discrimination depriving women of fundamental
rights only insofar as that deprivation stems from or perpetuates
a past legal condition that can be equated with slavery or involuntary servitude. An argument that women's past legal status
is comparable to that of blacks can be made, 17 2 although in fourteenth amendment litigation it has been difficult to persuade
courts to accept the comparison. 17 3 This approach, however, appears unnecessary in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail TransportationCo.' 74 The Court's McDonald decision must be read as holding that Congress has the
power to prohibit particular types of private discrimination regardless of the past or current legal status of the class to which
the victimized individual belongs.
172. See generally L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1969); G. MYRDAL, AN AMERCAN DILEMMA 1073-78
(1962); Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the
Law

School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47

N.Y.U.L. Rm. 1033 (1972). In studying the legal status of women for
purposes of thirteenth amendment interpretation, the focus must often
be on married women. Although single women were not directly burdened by every legal disability imposed upon married women, the stereotypes perpetuated by those disabilities affected the legal rights of all
women in the same way that the system of southern slavery, which was
not imposed on all blacks, nonetheless indirectly limited their legal
rights. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937); Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
173. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the closest the Court has come to majority recognition of the comparison in fourteenth amendment litigation.
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of "romantic paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal,
but in a cage ....

As a result of notions such as these, our stat-

ute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the
19th century the position of women in our society was, in many
respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War
slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve
on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women
traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey
property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children.
And although blacks were guaranteed the right to vote in
1870, women were denied even that right-which is itself "preservative of other basic civil and political rights"-until adoption
of the Nineteenth Amendment half a century later.
Id. at 684-85. With this position, compare Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451
(1976).
174. 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976).
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In McDonald, a white employee, who had allegedly been discharged because of his race, sued his employer under 42 U.S.C.
section 1981 for denying him the right to contract, solely
on the basis of race. Based on legislative history, the Supreme Court determined that the language of section 1981 proscribed discrimination against whites as well as blacks. The
Court did not even bother to discuss the authority of Congress
to enact a statute prohibiting private discrimination against
whites, although in its 1883 decision in United States v. Harris
the Court had observed that the thirteenth amendment could not
apply to white persons. 175 It simply stated, in a footnote, that
it had "previously ratified the view that Congress is authorized
under the Enfofeement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment to
legislate in regard to 'every race and individual.' -176
The Court in effect freed thirteenth amendment interpretation from any limitations based on an historical link with actual
slavery as it existed in the United States. It can hardly be argued that, as a class, white persons ever labored under conditions
of servitude or slavery. The logical implication of McDonald is
that Congress may prohibit private discrimination without regard to the current or former inferior legal status of the class
discriminated against. If this interpretation were accepted, congressional authority would become broad indeed. The standard
Supreme Court pronouncement that Congress may define for itself what constitute the badges and incidents of slavery 17 7 would
175. 106 U.S. 629, 641 (1882). See also the Court's rejection of the
thirteenth amendment argument in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
176. 96 S. Ct. at 2582 n.18.
Lower federal court opinions which reached the same conclusion are
not much more helpful in their discussion of constitutional authority.
Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1969), modified, 450 F.2d
1227 (8th Cir. 1971), and Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo. 1969), are limited to a statutory
interpretation of section 1981, and do not discuss constitutional authority
under the thirteenth amendment. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th
Cir. 1972) (en bane), involved discrimination by a public entity prohibited by the fourteenth amendment, which clearly applies to whites as
well as blacks without regard to past legal status. The court in Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90, 92 n.4 (D. Conn. 1975),
simply refers in a footnote. to the colorblind nature of the thirteenth
amendment. The brief, conclusory statement to like effect in WRMA
Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577, 581 (M.D. Ala. 1973),
is no more specific. Only the court in Speiss v. C. Itoh & Co. (America),
408 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. Tex. 1976), completely discusses the shift in thirteenth amendment interpretation that has occurred since Jones.
177. See text accompanying note 158 supra.
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amount to a judicial license to Congress to prohibit private discrimination against any individual, black or white, male or
female.
This interpretation of McDonald can be avoided only by construing the thirteenth amendment to apply only to conditions
or badges and incidents of slavery based on racial categories. If
the amendment were to be so construed, however, the Court
would have to disregard the amendment's race-neutral language. 178 It would also have to ignore the fact that Congress
has enacted thirteenth amendment legislation outlawing peonage
without regard to race and the Court has upheld the constitutionality of those statutes. 179
To be sure, the Court has already disregarded past decisions
which limited the scope of the amendment and confined con178. Buchanan notes:
[T]he framers of the thirteenth amendment . . . adopted language of general application not confined to any particular species of the evil they sought to eliminate. This concern with general categories rather than specific examples permeates the Constitution. In a document intended "to endure through a long
lapse of ages," a general clause should not be limited to the particular historical condition that originally inspired its inclusion
in the document. The impelling historical condition can inform
constitutional construction; it need not constrict it. If this canon
of constitutional construction is applied to the badge of slavery
concept, the conclusion becomes irresistible that Congress has
power under the thirteenth amendment to protect non-racial
classes.
Buchanan (pt. 8), supra note 41, at 1076-77.
179. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). See also Bailey
v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240-41 (1911) ("While the immediate concern
[of the Thirteenth Amendment] was with African slavery, the Amendment was not limited to that. It was a charter of universal civil freedom
for all persons, of whatever race, color or estate, under the flag."); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
In each of these cases the Supreme Court emphasized that peonage
is based on a system of forced labor and did not depend on the race
of the individual involved. In fact, in Pollock the Court stated that the
evil of peonage "has never had general approval anywhere, and its sporadic appearances have been neither sectional nor racial." 322 U.S. at
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1970).
That the thirteenth amendment is not tied to racial classes was recognized by the district court in Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp.,
350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
The plaintiff was a Mexican national who alleged under section 1981 that
he had been discriminated against by his employer because of his status
as an alien. On the basis of the legislative history of section 1981, the
district court held that aliens were protected under the statute, and thus
necessarily accepted the assumption that a nonracial class could be protected by Congress's thirteenth amendment power. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. For a discussion of the implications
of these opinions, see Buchanan (pt. 7), supra note 41, at 881-83.
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gressional power to proscribing slavery as an institution and to
protecting only individuals whose past legal status was the equivalent of a slave's.18 0 Since the McDonald Court disregarded
these early decisions, and expanded thirteenth amendment power
to protect white males from employment discrimination, a cynic
might argue that the Court is equally prepared to disregard its
previous decisions sanctioning race-neutral thirteenth amendment legislation and thereby exclude women from the amendment's protection because they are a nonracial class. That argument assumes, however, that the McDonald Court was simply
illogical in its interpretation of the Constitution and section 1981.
One would rather assume that the Court made a principled decision, applying the Constitution in light of changing circumstances
and responding to a contemporary need to confront private discrimination against persons other than blacks, to free the scope
of thirteenth amendment interpretation from its historical connection with persons whose ancestors were slaves. This concern
for private discrimination against persons other than blacks logically demands extension of the thirteenth amendment's protection to women, for sex discrimination is at least as invidious as
discrimination against white persons.
Once the original intent and historical framework of the thirteenth amendment have been thus disregarded, there is no justification for drawing a line between race and sex discrimination
on the ground that the drafters of the thirteenth amendment
were responding to the particular institution of slavery and its
effects on a particular race.""' In fact, to draw such a line would
create an anomalous situation: women, whose past and current
legal status corresponds to that of blacks with regard to political
rights, social privileges, and economic opportunities, would be deprived of the protection of an amendment that has been construed to prohibit discrimination perpetuating an inferior legal
status, while white men or racial groups whose past or current
legal status is not comparable to that of blacks are given the
amendment's full protection.
The Supreme Court may have been unaware of the logical
implications of McDonald. If so, it may retreat from its position
and perhaps leave women with thirteenth amendment protection
only if they can convince courts that their legal status once
180. See text accompanying notes 145-48 supra.
181. It should be noted that a brief allusion was made to the question
of sex discrimination in the debates over the thirteenth amendment. See
CONG. GLOBE,

38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864); note 157 supra.
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was comparable to that of black slaves. 182 If, however, the Court
adheres to the position that the thirteenth amendment empowers
Congress to enact legislation protecting white persons from private deprivations of fundamental rights without regard to their
past or current legal status, women as a class must logically share
18 3
in the amendment's protection.
Of course, even if the logical reading of McDonald is adopted
and Congress acknowledged to have power to proscribe private
sex discrimination, congressional authority is still limited by the
"badges and incidents" of slavery language. The Supreme Court
has indicated its belief that the thirteenth amendment prohibits
the deprivation of "fundamental rights which are the essense of
civil freedom,'

8 4
1

such as the rights protected by 42 U.S.C. sec-

tions 1981 and 1982.185 Notwithstanding the decisions in Hodges
v. United States'8 6 and the Civil Rights Cases,18 7 the Court has
also held that employment and access to public accommodations
may be protected by the thirteenth amendment. 8 8 Beyond that,
it is impossible to predict how the Supreme Court would define
182. See notes 172-73 supra.
183. Of course, should the Court adhere to McDonald, but refuse to
acknowledge the logical extension of the thirteenth amendment's coverage to women, the Court may simply furnish another example of a judicial double standard, and women would need, as previously noted, the
equivalent of the thirteenth amendment as well as the equal rights
amendment in order to receive full protection.

184. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968).
185. Id.
186. 203 U.S. 1 (1906).
187. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
188. McDonald explicitly recognized that the thirteenth amendment
protects employment rights. See also Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). With respect to public accommodations,
see the cautionary footnote in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409, 441 n.78 (1968). For a general discussion of what might constitute
badges and incidents of slavery, see Note, supra note 171, at 1307-12.
Buchanan, relying on legislative history and the language of the
Constitution, argues that arbitrary class prejudice is equivalent to badges
of slavery. Buchanan (pt. 8), supra note 41, at 1072-83.
For [the purpose of badge of slavery analysis] class prejudice
can be defined as any form of arbitrary prejudice which, in its
cumulative manifestations, has assumed a pattern of regional
significance. [T]he language of the Constitution itself shows express concern for problems of race, color, religion and sex. The
adoption of constitutional amendments expressly dealing with
problems generated by these four categories of arbitrary prejudice is strong evidence that each category, in the context of
American society, has assumed a pattern ... of regional significance.
Id. at 1082. See also Note, FederalPower to Regulte Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction
Era Amendments, 74 CoLum. L. Rsv. 449 (1974).
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badges and incidents of slavery. In any event, the restrictions
which the Court places on its own enforcement of the thirteenth
amendment do not necessarily apply to Congress:
The denial of the right of Negroes to swim in pools with white
people is said to be a "badge or incident" of slavery. Consequently, the argument seems to run, this Court should declare
that the city's closing of the pools to keep the two races from
swimming together violates the Thirteenth Amendment. To
reach that result from the Thirteenth Amendment would severely stretch its short simple words and do violence to its history. Establishing this Court's authority under the Thirteenth
Amendment to declare new laws to govern the thousands of
towns and cities of the country would grant it a law-making
power far beyond the imagination of the amendment's authors.
Finally, although the Thirteenth Amendment is a skimpy collection of words to allow this Court to legislate new laws to control the operation of swimming pools throughout the length and
breadth of this Nation, the Amendment does contain other words
that we held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. could empower
Congress to outlaw "badges of slavery." The last sentence of
the Amendment reads:
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."
But Congress has passed no law under this power to regulate
a city's opening189or closing of swimming pools or other recreational facilities.
Thus, the Court may defer to Congress's decision to promulgate
thirteenth amendment legislation to prohibit private discrimination where it would not of its own accord declare such private
action unconstitutional. 190
The Supreme Court's recent thirteenth amendment decisions
could provide important support to existing federal legislation
against private sex discrimination. For example, they should resolve any doubts concerning the extension of the Fair Housing
Act,19' consistently read as a piece of thirteenth amendment legislation, 9 2 to cover sex discrimination. With respect to federal
legislation enacted in the nineteenth century, however, their impact is uncertain. The language of 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 and
1982 may continue to be read, as a matter of congressional intent,
193
to provide protection only against private race discrimination.
189. 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971).
190. See note 188 supra for articles discussing possible limitations on
congressional power inhering in the badge of slavery concept. Any regulation of private conduct would also necessarily be limited by the need
to protect other constitutional rights, such as the rights to free association
and privacy. See Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2596 (1976).
191. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (Supp. V 1975).
192. See note 51 supra.
193. See the discussion of the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in McDon-
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The other significant statute, 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3), contains
no reference to race, but, because of the generality of its language, its impact depends on judicial interpretation. 9 4 As
noted earlier, federal courts have often failed to treat sex discrimination claims with the same concern given race discrimination, and the Supreme Court is reluctant to take action under
the thirteenth amendment without explicit congressional guidance. Thus, federal courts may refuse to provide women a remedy against private sex discrimination under the general language of section 1985 (3), despite the thirteenth amendment. 195
An exhaustive discussion of questions of statutory construction, however, will not be pursued here. The point is simply
that Congress has ample constitutional authority by virtue of the
ald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976), and the cases
cited in note 38 supra.
Although the Court found that section 1981 "was intended to protect
whites as well as nonwhites," 96 S. Ct. at 2584, one of its sources for
this piece of legislative history was a statement by Representative Shallabarger which suggests that women were not to be included within the
protection of what became section 1981: "Your State may deprive
women of the right to sue or contract or testify, and children from doing
the same. But if you do so, or do not so as to one race, you shall treat
the other likewise. .. " Id. at n.23. This statement represents the opinion of one legislator, and need not control the interpretation of "legislative history." During this period of American history women were not
considered "persons" deserving protection under the laws, see In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894), but when the nineteenth amendment granted
women the right to vote, any such argument to support discriminatory
treatment was foreclosed. Modern construction of the statute need not
be tied to discredited assumptions about the legal position of women.
194. The language of section 1985 (3) is general. See note 13 supra.
Thus, a court will have to determine whether the factual situation on
which a section 1985(3) cause of action is based involves the imposition
of a badge or an incident of slavery. If the court holds that none is involved, it cannot constitutionally apply the statute. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971), in which the Supreme Court allowed
a suit alleging racial discrimination to be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) after finding that "discriminatory private action [was] aimed
at depriving [blacks] of the basic rights that the law secures to all free
men." See also note 101 supra.
195. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 252 (1976) (No. 76-37), for
an example of what courts may do with sex discrimination claims
under federal legislation which is somewhat ambiguous. The court
there came perilously close to adoption of a "separate but equal" analysis in applying 20 U.S.C.. §§ 1701-1721, a statute ostensibly passed by
Congress to eliminate sex discrimination in education. It concluded,
over a strong dissent, that the statute was not applicable to a situation
in which a teenager had been refused admission to public high school
solely because of her sex.
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thirteenth amendment to reach innumerable types of sex discrimination. Courts can refuse to apply existing federal legislation
to private sex discrimination if the legislation is limited as a matter of congressional intent, but should not impose restrictions
based on an interpretation of constitutional authority.
III.

CONCLUSION

The question of the scope of congressional authority
over private sex discrimination is an important one. Current
debate over women's rights which has concentrated on the ratification of the equal rights amendment ignores the fact that the
amendment will neither add to congressional authority to remedy
the significant disparities in treatment of private race and sex
discrimination in existing federal legislation nor affect judicial
interpretations of nineteenth century civil rights laws. If the
legislative power given Congress by the enforcement clauses of
the fourteenth and, in particular, the thirteenth amendments is
properly evaluated, however, disparities resulting from congressional inaction and narrow judicial interpretations can be eliminated. Congress will be put on notice that there are constitutional sources of authority for a more far-reaching federal prohibition of private sex discrimination, and federal courts, asked
to apply existing federal legislation, such as 42 U.S.C. section 1985
(3), to proscribe private sex discrimination, should find no constitutional bar to that course of action.

